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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
ESSAY
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PUBLIC POLICY*
Ruggero J. Aldisert**
I. INTRODUCTION
I have been writing judicial opinions for fifty years: since
1969 as a federal appellate judge on the Third Circuit, and for
eight r ears before that on the Pennsylvania Court of Common
Pleas. For nearly forty years of that time, I have offered my
advice as an expert opinion writer to other judges in opinion-
*Adapted from Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing ch. 4 (2d ed., AuthorHouse 2009).
The reader should be aware that both Opinion Writing and this article draw on material first
published in Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Role of Courts in Contemporary Society, 38 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 437 (1977) and Ruggero J. Aldisert, Philosophy, Jurisprudence and
Jurisprudential Temperament of Federal Judges, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 453 (1987).
**Senior United States Circuit Judge, Chief Judge Emeritus, United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, whose books include Opinion Writing, 2d Ed. (AuthorHouse
2009); The Judicial Process: Text, Materials & Cases (2d ed., West Pub. Co. 1996); Logic
for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking (3d ed., Natl. Inst. for Trial Advocacy
1997); Winning on Appeal: Better Briefs and Oral Argument (2d ed., Natl. Inst. for Trial
Advocacy 2003); Road to the Robes: A Federal Judge Recollects Young Years & Early
Times (AuthorHouse 2005). Many thanks to my 2008-2009 law clerks Meehan Rasch and
Matthew P. Bartlett for their help in preparing this Essay, as well as for their invaluable
assistance, along with my 2007-2008 clerks Rita K. Lomio and Anika Christine Stucky, in
editing Opinion Writing, 2d Ed.
1. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court required trial judges to write an opinion in every
case that was appealed; to play it safe, I wrote an opinion in every final judgment.
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writing seminars and through my book Opinion Writing,2 which
for many years was distributed free of charge to all federal trial
and appellate judges, and to all state appellate judges, when they
took the bench. Over the past year, as I have revised and
prepared Opinion Writing, 2d Ed. for availability to a wider
audience, I have endeavored to provide my best practical
guidance on the nuts and bolts of opinion writing, style, and
structure, as well as on the judicial decisionmaking process and
the theoretical underpinnings of opinion writing. I have
encouraged opinion writers to keep their readers in mind as they
write, and have advised opinion readers on how better to
4understand the opinion-writing process. However, no
comprehensive discussion of opinion writing theory can be
complete without a discussion of judicially declared public
policy.
Recent criticism of judges-whether as lawmakers or as
interpreters of constitutional or statutory text-has been
particularly strong when they base decisions on considerations
of public policy. Such decisions generate controversy on
grounds both political and institutional. Public policy issues
more readily inspire the familiar labels of "liberal,"
"conservative," "strict constructionist," or "a Bork-type." They
provoke criticism from social, economic, and political
perspectives. Some critics argue from an institutional
perspective, contending that articulating policies for the public
interest is the task of state and national legislatures rather than
federal or state judiciaries. Depending upon the viewpoint of the
critic, judges who seek to advance the common good expressly
through policymaking are pilloried as either "activists" or
"traditionalists." This controversial aspect of judicial
responsibilities demonstrates the interplay among the
2. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing (West 1990) [hereinafter Opinion Writing
1990]. The first edition of Opinion Writing was not made available to the general public.
3. I was commissioned by West Publishing to write Opinion Writing 1990 as an
expansion of discussions held at the Senior Judge Seminars sponsored by the Institute of
Judicial Administration at New York University in 1970-1971, 1973-1982, and 1985. It
reflected, also, ideas discussed in opinion writing seminars I taught for newly appointed
judges at the Federal Judicial Center in 1974-1980 and 1982.
4. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Meehan Rasch & Matthew P. Bartlett, Opinion Writing
and Opinion Readers, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (2009).
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components of the trichotomy of legal philosophy,
jurisprudence, and jurisprudential temperament.
II. OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Roger J. Traynor admonished us not to "be misled by the
half-truth that policy is a matter for [only] the legislators to
decide."5 The courts are continually called upon to weigh
considerations of public policy when adding to the content of the
common law, when filling in statutory gaps left by an
inattentive, divided, or politically sensitive legislature, and when
applying constitutional precepts to changing and novel
circumstances. In all these aspects of the judicial process,
considerations of public policy may be compelling or even
decisive. David A. J. Richards emphasized the same point,
noting that policy considerations underpin even the threshold
doctrines of justiciability:
[T]he proper ends of adjudication surely at least sometimes
include policies. For example, the many discretionary rules
of standing, ripeness, mootness, and the like clearly rest in
part on policies of conserving judicial resources, a social
policy of maximum output from limited inputs. Even aside
from the problematics of the proper weight of principle and
policy in understanding these rules, many cases of
adjudication on the merits clearly invoke policies, as in
many instances of statutory construction. Even where there
is no clear legislative intent, courts invoke policy
considerations sua sponte in order to effectuate a sensible
legislative result; the burgeoning area of federal common
law is one example.6
These American authorities have rejected sentiments
voiced by English judges of an earlier era: that "public policy..
. is a very unruly horse and when once you get astride it you
never know where it will carry you,"7 and that judges are more
5. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 749 (1970).
6. David A.J. Richards, Rules, Policies, and Neutral Principles: The Search for
Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional Adjudication, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 1069, 1097-
98 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
7. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (Burrough,
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to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as expounders of
public policy. 8 And yet, more recent United Kingdom jurists do
not follow the teachings of the earlier era. The venerable Lord
Denning, for instance, applied the modem view in his discussion
of the measure of damages in a tort case:
At bottom, I think the question of recovering economic loss
is one of policy. Whenever the courts draw a line to mark
out the bounds of duty, they do it as a matter of policy so as
to limit the responsibility of the defendant. Whenever the
courts set bounds to the damages recoverable-saying that
they are, or are not, too remote-they do it as a matter of
policy so as to limit the liability of the defendant. 9
Justice Hopkins of the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court was similarly realistic in declaring that among
the several devices available as bases for decisions-such as
maxims, doctrines, precedents, and statutes-public policy is
primary. As he put it, "[t]he other grounds for a judicial decision
yield to the declaration of public policy, once that policy is
ascertained."'1 0
Although much of the controversy concerning judicial
implementation of public policy is of recent vintage, the practice
itself is longstanding and well established in common law
adjudication. As early as 1881, Justice Holmes wrote:
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention,
and always with an apology, are the secret root from which
the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course,
considerations of what is expedient for the community
concerned. Every important principle which is developed
by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or
less definitely understood views of public policy; most
generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and
inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views
of public policy in the last analysis. 1
8. In re Mirams, (1891) 1 Q.B. 594, 595.
9. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. (1973) 1 Q.B. 27,
36.
10. James D. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 323, 323 (1971).
11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 35-36 (Little Brown 1881).
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Notwithstanding the importance of these considerations to
judicial decisionmaking, it is well to remember that judges are
far more constrained than legislators in fashioning or declaring
public policy. Professor and former Yale Law School Dean
Wellington offers the thoughtful suggestion that
when a court justifies a common law (as distinguished from
a statutory or constitutional) rule with a policy, it is
proceeding in a fashion recognized as legitimate only if two
conditions are met: The policy must be widely regarded as
socially desirable and it must be relatively neutral. 2
This poses an obvious question: How may-indeed, how can-a
court determine whether a policy is socially desirable?
Wellington recommended that in fashioning common law on
public policy grounds, the court first look
to the corpus of law--decisional, enacted, and
constitutional-to determine whether relevant policies have
received legal recognition....
[i]n determining the extent of a policy's social desirability,
a court should examine such things as political platforms,
and take seriously-for this purpose-campaign promises
and political speeches. The media is a source of evidence
and so too are public opinion polls. Books and articles in
professional journals, legislative hearings and reports, and
the reports of special committees and institutes are all
evidence. 13
The sound requirement of neutrality extends to
constitutional and statutory interpretation as well as to common
law adjudication. The principle of neutrality demands that
judges, who are intentionally shielded from the pressures of
interest groups by the structure of American government, should
not justify their rulings by accepting the demands of one interest
group at the expense of another that is not party to the
litigation.1 4 Professor Wechsler bore the brunt of much
criticism-unfounded and undeserved-for his 1959 Holmes
12. Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221, 236 (1973).
13. Id. at 236-37.
14. Id. at 238.
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lecture on neutrality, given at Harvard Law School.
15
Commenting in 1975 on that criticism, he reasserted the
importance of his principle:
The central thought is surely that the principle once
formulated must be tested by the adequacy of its derivation
from its sources and its implications with respect to other
situations that the principle, if evenly applied, will
comprehend. Unless those implications are acceptable the
principle surely must be reformulated or withdrawn.16
This, I suggest, is but the jurisprudential expression of
Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative: "Act only on that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law."'17 (I concede of course that
some subscribe instead to George Bernard Shaw's advice: "Do
not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you.
Their tastes may not be the same."' 8)
The essence of neutrality is the quality of evenhandedness,
a recognition that whatever influence special interests may have
in legislative decisionmaking, the imposition of special burdens
on, or the granting of special favors to, a particular group has no
place in adjudication-no place, that is, absent principled
reasons for being there. Special-interest decisionmaking is for
only the legislative branch, which has perfected the art; statutes
are the products of a series of marginal adjustments and
compromises among various semi-independent groups.9
Legislation is the art of accommodation, and politics is the art of
the possible. And the possible is conditioned by the ballot box.
Modem legislators seem to accommodate only the perceived
desires of the parochial constituencies whose members elect or
support them, setting aside any consideration of what is
15. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1959).
16. Herbert Wechsler, Remarks at Federal Appellate Judges' Conference (Fed. Jud.
Ctr., Wash., D.C., Mar. 12, 1975), in Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 630-31 (2d
ed., West Pub. Co. 1996).
17. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 88 (H.J. Paton trans.,
Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1964).
18. George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman: A Comedy and a Philosophy 227
(Brentano's 1903) (section titled Maxims for Revolutionists).
19. See Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review
29 (Prentice Hall 1966).
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preferable for the entire population of the state or nation. Even
within their own electorates, they often fail to equate numbers
with influence, for experience has taught them that minorities
punish, but majorities seldom protect.
The judiciary is not equally restrained by, or susceptible to,
the interests of electorates confined within relatively small
legislative districts, nor does it have available to it the
legislature's opportunities for largess. Judges can learn what is
widely regarded as desirable by identifying, isolating, and then
weighing the same factors legislators would take into account-
and then, when it is proper to do so, ignoring those factors.
Because they can, with courage and dignity, eschew parochial
and partisan factors, judges are able to make their decisions on
the fairly neutral bases of principles and rights.
Assuming the essential element of neutrality, we must turn
now to a broader canvas of the factors relevant to policy
declaration. How is the judge to ascertain the public interest and
the policies that will advance it? Dean Rostow addressed this
problem as a search for the "common morality of a society. 2 °
Professor Friedmann believed it necessary to identify the
collective judgment in terms of the basic norms of the
community's life. He suggested that a primary source of
information would be the general state of contemporary
legislative policy, but argued also that the judge should turn to
the state of organization in the society in which he lived, make
note of the groupings and pulls of the major social forces of his
society, be aware of society's pluralistic aspects, and recognize
the state of modem science.
2
Professor Hart also discussed the importance of
ascertaining the conventional morality of an actual social group,
referring to
20. Eugene V. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 Cambridge L.J. 174, 197
(1960). Rostow described this common morality as
a blend of custom and conviction, of reason and feeling, of experience and
prejudice.... [I]n the life of the law, especially in a common law country, the
customs, the common views, and the habitual patterns of the people's behaviour
properly count for much .... All movements of law reform seek to carry out
certain social judgments as to what is fair and just in the conduct of society.
Id.
21. Wolfgang Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 Colum. L.
Rev. 821, 843-45 (1961).
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standards of conduct which are widely shared in a
particular society, and are to be contrasted with the moral
principles or moral ideals which may govern an
individual's life, but which he does not share with any
considerable number of those with whom he lives.22
This is perhaps the most critical aspect of our inquiry. The judge
must screen out personal bias, passion, and prejudice, and
attempt always to distinguish between a personal cultivated taste
and the general notions of moral obligation. Such standards of
conduct reflect an obligation to respect rules of society. They
are, in Hart's formulation, primary rules of obligation because of
"the serious social pressure by which they are supported, and by
the considerable sacrifice of individual interest or inclination
which compliance with them involves." 23 And Professor
Wellington said that the way in which one learns about the
conventional morality of society "is to live in it, become
sensitive to it, experience widely, read extensively, and
ruminate, reflect, and analyze situations that seem to call moral
obligations into play."
24
The line of inquiry proposed by Rostow, Friedman, Hart
and others is similar to that proposed by Wellington to
determine what is "socially desirable" for common law
adjudication. 25 The attempt to base a decision on social
consensus, however, is fraught with peril and, in the
interpretation of constitutional precepts, may be inappropriate.
As Professor Jaffe once inquired:
How does one isolate and discover a consensus on a
question so abstruse as the existence of a fundamental
right? The public may value a right and yet not believe it to
be fundamental. The public may hold that the rights of
parents are fundamental and yet have no view whether they
include sending a child to a private school. There may be a
profound ambiguity in the public conscience; it may
profess to entertain a traditional ideal but be reluctant to act
upon it. In such a situation might we not say that the judge
will be free to follow either the traditional ideal or the
22. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 165 (Oxford U. Press 1961).
23. Id.
24. Wellington, supra n. 12, at 246.
25. See supra nn. 7-22 and accompanying text.
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existing practice, depending upon the reaction of his own
conscience? And in many cases will it not be true that there
has been no general thinking on the issue? 26
A classic example of judges mistaking the public consensus
is the position perennially espoused by Justices Brennan and
Marshall in death penalty cases. Their concurring opinions in
Furman v. Georgia 7 took the position that the death penalty
was unconstitutional "cruel and unusual punishment" because it
was out of step with contemporary community values.28 The
rush of state legislatures to impose the death penalty after their
1972 statements, however, showed an unmistakable community
reaction, at least in the immediately following years, that was in
complete opposition to their statements. 29 The tendency for
judges to find society's values in their own is a constant danger.
Much adjudication in the federal courts, especially in
constitutional interpretations based on concepts of public policy,
moral standards, and public welfare, is little more than the
conscious or unconscious imposition of certain judges' personal
values. Many of us who purport to be objective in identifying
community values, and who are indeed sincere about it, are
actually intent on attaining immediate social ends that we
personally see as moral imperatives.
Adherence to the principle of neutrality in judicial
decisionmaking provides a check against the temptation to
substitute personal for social values. As Professor Greenawalt
26. Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 986, 994 (1967).
27. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
28. Id. at 295-300 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360-69 (Marshall, J., concurring).
29. In Opinion Writing 1990, I noted that a Gallup Poll taken in November 1985
disclosed that three out of four Americans favored the death penalty, seventeen percent
opposed it, and eight percent were undecided. See Opinion Writing 1990, supra n. 2, at 42,
n. 25 (citing Gallup Poll Finds Sharp Rise in Support for Death Penalty, 134 N.Y. Times
A20 (Nov. 28, 1985)). Analysis of a Gallup Poll taken in October 2007 notes that although
sixty-nine percent of Americans were then still in favor of the death penalty for a murder
conviction, over the years support for the sentence of life without parole as an alternative to
the death penalty has steadily increased. When the Gallup question provides the respondent
with an explicit alternative to the death penalty ("life imprisonment, with absolutely no
possibility of parole"), support for the death penalty typically has registered in the range of
forty-seven percent to fifty-four percent. See Frank Newport, Sixty-Nine Percent of
Americans Support Death Penalty, Gallup News Release (Oct. 12, 2007),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/101 863/Sixtynine-Percent-Americans-Support-Death-Penalty.
aspx (accessed Oct. 14, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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has observed,
[s]erious moral choices typically involve some conflict
between an action that would serve one's narrow self-
interest and an action that would satisfy responsibilities
toward others. The dangers of bias are extreme; either we
value too highly our own interest or over-compensate and
undervalue it. The discipline of imagining similar situations
in which we are not involved or play a different role more
nearly enables us to place appropriate values on competing
considerations.
30
Similarly, a consideration of the first principles of legal
philosophy may place a particular issue of public concern in a
broader, more principled context and may force us to recognize
any inconsistencies between our intuitive moral values and the
more general philosophy of law to which we may subscribe.
Indeed,
[w]e may discover that some of our intuitive moral views
are not consistent with other intuitive views or with
generalized principles to which we subscribe. As we test
our intuitive reactions to particular situations against our
accepted principles, both may give a little, until we arrive at
what John Rawls calls a "reflective equilibrium," in which
our sense of right for particular issues matches our
principles.
31
An important component of our jurisprudential
temperament is the threshold at which judges are willing to act
in disregard or contravention of prevailing social norms, the
extent to which they are willing to confront the antimajoritarian
difficulty. 32 In those instances in which social consensus is
30. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 982, 997 (1978).
31. Id.
32. Professor Laurence Tribe contends that this problem is inherent in constitutional
government:
Whether imposed by unelected judges or by elected officials conscientious and
daring enough to defy popular will in order to do what they believe the
Constitution requires, choices to ignore the majority's inclinations in the name
of a higher source of law invariably raise questions of legitimacy in a nation that
traces power to the people's will.... In its most basic form, the question in such
cases is why a nation that rests legality on the consent of the governed would
choose to constitute its political life in terms of commitments to an original
agreement-made by the people, binding on their children, and deliberately
structured so as to be difficult to change. Since that question would arise, albeit
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asserted as an appropriate basis for judicial declarations of
public policy, how should a judge reconcile what Professor
Fuller called the "inner voice of conscience ' 33 with prevailingcommunity standards?
II. JUDICIAL DECLARATION WHERE THERE Is No CONSENSUS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY
In seeking an answer, I first distinguish between
circumstances in which there is a consensus and those in which
there is not. We should agree that free societies will change
because it is their nature to do so. New ideas can gather strength
in the social or intellectual marketplace and achieve the
consensus. When these ideas are admitted and so absorbed, the
legal system should expand to hold them. Conversely, the legal
system should contract to squeeze out old policies that have lost
the consensus they once held. The expansion or contraction of
the legal system to reach these goals is what we call judicially
declared public policy. So perceived, social consensus demands
sympathy from the court.
Where the legislature has not acted in accordance with
changing social policies and seemingly does not so intend to act,
the courts have not only the authority, but possibly the duty, to
keep pace with the change in consensus. Individual legislators
then function in only one direction: to ensure their own re-
election with the kind of Darwinian instinct that tells animals
they must fight to preserve their genetic stocks. The prevailing
tendency among most legislators is to avoid a vote on any
controversial issue likely to produce differences in opinion
among their constituents back home. Richard Neely, a former
justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court and a former state
less dramatically, even without the institution of judicial review, its answer must
be sought at a level more fundamental than is customary in discussions of why
judges, appointed for life, should wield great power. For even without such
judges, it must be stressed, lawmakers and administrators sworn to uphold the
Constitution must from time to time ask themselves, if they take their oath
seriously, why its message should be heeded over the voices of their
constituents.
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 10 (2d ed., Found. Press 1988).
33. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 630, 635 (1958).
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legislator, is more blunt:
[A] legislature is designed to do nothing, with the emphasis
appropriately placed on the word "designed." The value of
an institution whose primary attribute is inertia to
politicians who wish to keep their jobs is that a majority of
bills will die from inactivity; that then permits legislators to
be "in favor" of a great deal of legislation without ever
being required to vote on it. When constituents seek to hold
a legislator responsible for the failure of a particular bill, he
can say, plausibly, that it was assigned to a committee on
which he did not serve and that he was unable to shake the
bill out of that committee. If he has foreseen positive
constituent interest, he can produce letters from the
committee chairman in answer to his excited pleas to report
the legislation to the floor; correspondence of this sort is
the stock in trade of legislators. Notwithstanding the
earnest correspondence, it is quite possible that when the
legislator and committee chairman were having a drink
before dinner, the legislator indicated his personal desire to
kill the bill in spite of the facade of excited
correspondence.34
But this does not mean that the judge must act only when
public opinion reflects a majoritarian viewpoint, or even a
plurality viewpoint. Had the Supreme Court waited for public
consensus we might never have had Brown v. Board of
Education;35 in 1954 there was no national consensus for the
compulsory integration of the public school system. This was
one of those times that call for judicial intervention-or more
properly, judicial operation-in advance of the consensus,
which the judge may therefore properly outrun. In doing so,
however, he or she must tread delicately.
III. FOUR CONCERNS TO BE ADDRESSED IN JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
I suggest that judges must address the following concerns
when declaring public policy:
34. Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America 55 (Yale U. Press 1981) (emphasis in
original).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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1. Judges must be impartial and independent
in both the decisionmaking process and
the process of justification.
2. Judges must convey the distinct
impression and appearance of
impartiality.
3. Judges must fulfill the obligations of
neutrality and the obligations of both
justice in rem, socially desirable because
it is based on some pre-eminent moral
principle, and justice in personam,
individually desirable because it yields
justice for the parties to a given lawsuit.
4. Judges must identify and evaluate the
relevant private, social, public, and
governmental interests. These must be not
only evaluated, but compared, accepted,
rejected, tailored, adjusted and, if
necessary, subjected to judicial
compromise.
Judges must be especially careful to cleave to the first
principle of the reasoning process, which starts the march to the
specific conclusion (or declaration of public policy): It must be a
concept universally held and uniformly respected. It must be
related to at least one of what I have described elsewhere as
supereminent principles of the law: creating and protecting
property interests; creating and protecting liberty interests;
fulfilling promises; redressing losses caused by breach or fault;
and punishing those who wrong the public.
36
36. Cf Ruggero J. Aldisert, House of the Law, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 755 (1985).
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IV. WEIGHING OF INTERESTS IN JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY
More often than not, public policy derives from a sub-
process of the judicial process now popularly known as
"balancing interests." With a seemingly inexhaustible inventory
of social interests pressing upon judges and jurists for attention,
judicial "balancing" seeks a reasoned accommodation of the
competing interests and the resolution of their conflicts. Perhaps
most critical to this process, judges and jurists must first identify
and categorize the various individual, public and social interests.
As Dean Pound recognized, the validity of the technique
depends, in the first instance, on whether all relevant identifiable
interests are placed on the scale.37
The expression "balancing interests" is useful, perhaps, but
seriously misleading. It implies that the subject matter of the
judicial process is somehow quantifiable. It is not subject to
such quantification, notwithstanding the itch in this computer
age to put numbers to every phenomenon. The best that can be
hoped is that all the interests at stake in a case are identifiable.
Having identified the interests at stake, judges can at least
consider them, as I doubt that they can ever really be
"balanced." Before the accommodation takes place, however,
like types of interests must be identified. As there are fruits and
fruits, e.g., apples and oranges, so are there interests and
interests.
37. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1943).
38. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 478-81, 524-28, 604-13 (West 1996).
It seems appropriate to note here that although courts frequently use the expression
"interests," there is little judicial explanation of the word. This is very unusual, for all
current judicial decisions involve a recognition, stated or unstated, of certain interests. In
fact, most decisions involve a weighing of competing interests that have been
unquestionably identified and recognized. For myself, I have gone through an evolving
process that now leads me to define an interest as a social fact, factor, or phenomenon
reflected by a claim, demand, or desire that human beings, either individually or as groups,
seek to satisfy and that has been recognized as socially valid by authoritative decision
makers in society. Compare my earlier formulation in id. at 489, where I stated that "[aln
interest is a social fact, factor or phenomenon reflected by a claim or demand or desire
which human beings, either individually or as groups or associations or relations, seek to
satisfy and which has been recognized as socially valid by authoritative decision makers in
society."
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We then get to the question of how judges identify the
groupings of behavior and values that will influence their
decisions. Justice Cardozo recognized that
[t]he whole of the judicial function . . . [involves] the
subjective sense of justice inherent in the judge, guided by
an effective weighing of the interests of the parties ... and
in weighing conflicting interests, the interest that is better
founded in reason and more worthy of protection should be
helped to achieve victory.39
Other than by an exercise of a threshold value judgment on
certain factual phenomena, either in the record or in the judge's
experience, I can find no other point at which judicial
decisionmaking can begin. This threshold judgment continues to
color a judge's thinking as he or she gropes toward a decision in
the case.
Once judges designate an interest, they then make a value
judgment as to whether it is worthy of protection. If that is the
tentative inclination, they then summon relevant precepts that
command a definite legal consequence. If specific rules in the
narrow sense are found wanting, the judges range further to the
generalized precept of legal principle or a still more abstract
precept known as a doctrine or dogma. If rules of law,
principles, or legal doctrines fail to provide an answer, the courts
then look to a moral principle and make a judgment as to
whether it should be converted into a legal precept.4 0 Where a
satisfactory legal precept is then found or articulated on the basis
of these facts, the courts have wrapped legal protection around
the designated social facts or factors.
I believe that this accurately characterizes the anatomy of
the judicial decisional process. I believe also that a critical
component of the process is the interest identified or favored by
a given judge in a given court reaching a particular result in a
particular case. In consequence, one primary responsibility of
39. Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 73-74 (Yale U. Press 1921)
(quoting Jcharm Georg Gmelin, Sociological Method).
40. Examples of this process in constitutional law are plentiful. See e.g. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The classic example in state tort law is the
adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (providing for strict products
liability), now superseded. See also Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Nature of the Judicial
Process: Revisited, 49 Cinn. L. Rev. 1, 39-40 (1980).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
the appellate advocate is the identification of the interests being
weighed today by the courts. This, alas, often does not take
place. Too often, briefs simply recite the various leading cases
and attempt to bring the particular dispute within the boundaries
of the decisions thought to be controlling. They address too
briefly, if at all, the interests implicated in the decision. Such
briefs are of little aid to the court. To be a success, Justice
Brandeis wrote in his notebook, a lawyer must "[k]now not only
the specific case, but the whole subject .... Know not only those
facts which bear on direct controversy, but know all the facts
and laws that surround.'
1
Referring to his notable survey of social interests, in a
magnificent abstraction of the nature and ends of law, Pound
said:
Looked at functionally, the law is an attempt to satisfy, to
reconcile, to harmonize, to adjust these overlapping and
often conflicting claims and demands, either through
securing them directly and immediately, or through
securing certain individual interests, so as to give effect to
the greatest total of interests or to the interests that weigh
most in our civilization, with the least sacrifice of the
scheme of interests as a whole.42
The process derives from the writings of the German jurist
Rudolf von Jhering, who designated the method as
Interessenjurisprudenz, a jurisprudence of interests.43 Under this
method of dispute resolution, according to Professor Antieau,
the court identifies the opposed societal interests, reconciles
them if possible and, if reconciliation is not possible, rules that
one societal interest under the circumstances must prevail over
another, with an explanation of why this is so." The process is
41. Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and the Progressive Tradition 6 (Little
Brown & Co. 1981).
42. Pound, supra n. 37, at 39.
43. See generally Rudolph von Jhering, Law as a Means to an End (Isaac Husik trans.,
Boston Book Co. 1913).
44. Chester James Antieau, The Jurisprudence of Interests as a Method of
Constitutional Adjudication, 27 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 823, 829 (1977) (quoting illustrative
passages from Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 286 (1940), Thomas v. Collins, 232 U.S. 516
(1945), and Saia v. N. Y, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)).
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
very much at work today in many aspects of adjudication,
especially in tort and constitutional law.45
V. CONCLUSION
I believe that judges today do consider the pragmatic
effects of alternative courses of decision. In their declarations of
public policy, they attempt to accommodate the social needs of
all who would be affected by their decisions, irrespective of
whether those affected were the litigants before them. They look
to the general state of contemporary legislative policy and the
felt needs of the society-insofar as they can discern those needs
in an increasingly pluralistic society. They consider economic
forces, scientific developments, and identifiable expressions of
public opinion. To be sure, this decisional process has
deontological as well as axiological overtones. It bears a
remarkable resemblance to classic natural law.46
45. But of course not every judge and scholar endorses the method. See e.g. Louis
Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1022, 1022-
23 (1978) (noting that "[s]ome have seen a tendency toward 'lawlessness' . . . in the
growing resort by the courts to 'balancing' in constitutional adjudication," and noting
further that the author is here "reflecting on different uses of balancing in constitutional
discourse" and attempting "to distinguish two kinds of balancing in constitutional
jurisprudence"). For examples of how competing interests are weighed and reconciled in
two antitrust cases, see Tose v. First Penn. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1981), and
Unger v. Dunkin Donuts ofAm., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976).
46. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Role of the Courts in Contemporary Society, 38 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 437, 445 (1977) (recognizing that "contemporary American courts are
resorting more and more to the method of sociology as a primary decisional tool," that
"[t]his decisional process has deontological as well as teleological overtones," and that it
"bears a remarkable resemblance to classical natural law").

